Despite the dramatic reduction of poverty in China over the past 35 years, poverty has not been fully eradicated in rural areas and, in the context of growing inequalities, it remains a national concern. This paper examines a local cash-for-work program launched in mountainous areas of the Beijing municipality in December 2004, with a view to understanding both the challenges and achievements of pro-poor programs in China. Using original household survey data, we first highlight the fairly good targeting performance of the program towards the local poor. Second, participation equations provide evidence of increasing local income without crowding out local agricultural activities. Finally, a decomposition of household income inequality by source highlights the strongly equalizing effect of the program on peasants' income.
Introduction
One of the United Nations Millennium Development Goals is to halve the incidence of global poverty by 2015 (UNDP 2003) . Designing policies that can help achieve this goal poses a major policy challenge to governments in developing countries where the poor devote most of their time and energy to searching for survival means and are trapped in situations where there is no hope for them to break away. In-kind and cash transfer programs are widely used to help the poor move out of the poverty trap. Typical tools include unconditional cash transfers, conditional cash transfers, and cash or food for work. Cash-for-work (CFW) programs are aimed at creating income-generating activities among local poor households by providing them with temporary employment opportunities, mostly through infrastructure building or local resources protection. In a similar vein, food-for-work (FFW) programs consist of paying the poor with food in exchange for work on local public infrastructure projects or learning new skills or new agricultural methods.
Several issues are central to the evaluation of CFW or FFW programs in terms of household income and livelihood patterns. They include targeting people most in need, evaluating potential disincentive effects on agricultural activities, and assessing their overall impact on income inequality. From a theoretical perspective, there are a number of expected beneªts for recipients of CFW or FFW. Beyond increased food consumption and the improvement of productivity through better local infrastructure, such transfers can also contribute to reducing the liquidity constraints that rural households often face in the context of developing countries where credit and insurance markets are largely imperfect or missing (Bezu and Holden 2008) . It has also been argued, however, that these expected beneªts could be counterbalanced by distortions brought by CFW or FFW to local labor markets through inºated wages or unsustainable shifts in the labor force towards non-vital activities (Abdulai, Barrett, and Hoddinott 2005) , and to agricultural production through reduced investment in productive assets (Bezu and Holden 2008) .
A number of papers have empirically assessed CFW or FFW programs in the context of African countries or India.
1 Most show that their targeting performance has not been entirely satisfactory and stress the need for better design and implementation of the programs. Using a nationally representative survey of 4,166 farm households in Ethiopia, Clay, Molla and Habtewold (1999) ªnd no signiªcant association between household food insecurity and food aid receipts, even after controlling for other characteristics of the households. In a similar vein, Jayne et al. (2002) ªnd a signiªcant inverse association between mean per capita income and the probability 88 
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Pro-rural Policies, Income, and Inequality of receiving free food or food-for-work in Ethiopia, a result they interpret as illustrating a degree of inertia in food aid distribution over time. In the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh, Deshingkar, Johnson, and Farrington (2005) document different ways in which design faults, administrative mismanagement, and local corruption excluded very poor and lower caste people from participating in a FFW program.
As to whether CFW or FFW programs have disincentive effects on agricultural labor and investment, there is considerable evidence supporting that they do not. In rural Kenya, Bezuneh, Deaton, and Norton (1988) show that FFW transfers allow peasants to accumulate more capital, which increases the opportunity cost of their time, and therefore encourages a shift over time from FFW towards own-farm production.
In the same area, Barrett, Bezuneh, and Aboud (2001) conªrm that FFW signiªcantly reduced liquidity constraints for poorer recipient households, enabling them to pursue more lucrative farm and non-farm activities and to increase both crop income and non-farm income. In the Tigray region in Ethiopia, Bezu and Holden (2008) ªnd a positive impact of FFW on the adoption of fertilizer and no production disincentive effect. Andersson, Mekonnen, and Stage (2011) also ªnd no evidence that participation in the Ethiopian Productive Safety Net Program induces rural households to disinvest in livestock or trees.
China provides ground for an interesting case study in the assessment of pro-poor policies. With an average real GDP growth rate of 9.8 percent over 1978-2012, the Chinese economy has grown at an unprecedented pace in recent decades. Multiplying per capita real GDP by 17.2, this sustained growth has contributed to a strong increase in income and a sharp reduction in absolute poverty. Hence, according to the World Bank, China has reduced its population living under the extreme poverty line of US$ 1.25 per day (at 2005 purchasing power parity price) from 43 percent of the world's total poor population in 1981 to 13 percent in 2010 (Olinto et al. 2013) . The unequal distribution of the beneªts of growth and the persistence of poverty in rural areas remain critical, however, notwithstanding impressive achievements in poverty reduction (Ravallion and Chen 2007; Glauben et al. 2012) . At the end of 2012, the number of people living under the ofªcial China poverty line (at 2,300 yuan [US$ 361] annual net income in 2010 prices) was close to 99 million (NBS 2013). Recognizing the major challenges of persistent poverty and increasing inequality between rural and urban areas, Chinese policymakers have devoted more efforts and resources since the mid 2000s to helping the very poor in the countryside through a series of pro-rural policy initiatives, more generally embedded into the development goal of establishing a "harmonious society." These policies, which mark an important turning point in the development strategy of the Chinese government, include the reform of the rural taxation and ªscal system (with the (Nolte 2008) . As for a number of other natural resource protection initiatives taken by the Chinese government during the 2000s, the ultimate objective of the policy is to achieve a win-win situation in terms of environmental protection and poverty alleviation. The CFW scheme under study consists of employing local peasants (with a ªxed monthly remuneration) for protecting the village forest against ªre, pest, or unauthorized logging. Although the area under study has been lifted out of extreme poverty, the average income remains low and there is room for in-kind and cash transfers to help increase peasants' income in the area. Using data drawn from a household survey conducted in participating villages, this paper contributes to a better understanding of pro-poor programs challenges and short-run achievements through the case study of a local small-scale program. The econometric estimation of participation equations at the household and individual levels indicates a fairly good targeting performance of the program towards the local poor and those with limited alternative income-generating opportunities. It also provides evidence of increasing local income without crowding out local agricultural activities. Last, a decomposition of household income inequality by source highlights the strongly equalizing effect of the program on peasants' income.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief account of the rural poverty issue in China and introduces the Compensation Mechanism for Ecological Forests in Beijing's Mountain Area. Section 3 presents the data. Section 4 uses descriptive analysis and multivariate analysis to examine the program participation at the household and individual levels. Section 5 assesses the distributional impact of the program. Section 6 concludes.
Rural poverty and pro-poor policies in China
2.1 Rural poverty in China "Looking back to 1981, China's incidence of poverty (measured by the percentage below $1.25 per day) was roughly twice that for the rest of the developing world; by the mid 1990s, the Chinese poverty rate had fallen well below average." This quote from Ravallion (2010, p. 1602) illustrates the dramatic reduction of poverty in China, which has made it possible for the country to achieve the UN Millennium Development Goal of reducing by half the number of its people living in extreme poverty far earlier than the speciªed 2015 deadline. Despite the undeniable and spectacular achievement of China in terms of poverty reduction, however, poverty has not been fully eradicated and, in the context of growing inequalities, it remains a national concern. Because poverty is largely a rural phenomenon, rural policies are key instruments in the ªght against poverty in lagging regions, as reºected by the 11 consecutive "No. 1 Central Documents" issued jointly by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council that have been dedicated to rural issues between 2004 and 2014 (Xinhua News Agency 2014).
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As stressed in the literature, the pattern of poverty reduction in China has not been smooth. Starting with an estimated number of rural people living in extreme poverty at 250 million in 1978 4 (Glauben et al. 2012) , China has experienced a rapid decline in poverty in the ªrst half of the 1980s. The implementation of the household responsibility system and the development of rural industries through township and village enterprises successfully spurred rural economic growth across the nation and contributed to rural income growth in the 1980s (Lin 1992; Weitzman and Xu 1994) , although as the economic reform focus shifted to cities after 1984, urban areas became the main beneªciaries of rapid economic growth and from the late 91 Asian Economic Papers Pro-rural Policies, Income, and Inequality 1980s rural income growth slowed down and poverty reduction stagnated in the countryside (Chen and Wang 2001; Ravallion and Chen 2007) . In the mid 1990s, rural China experienced a second episode of sharp poverty reduction thanks to signiªcant increases in the procurement prices of agricultural products (Imai and You 2013) . The urban-rural gap continued to widen, however, leading the 16th National Congress of the Communist Party in 2002 to set the increase of rural households' income as the main goal for the next decade and the move of labor force out of farming as a way of achieving this goal (Dong, Dong, Bowles, and Chang 2010) . Building a "harmonious society" based on more balanced growth between rural and urban areas became a popular slogan and in March 2006 the National People's Congress approved the intention to "build a new socialist countryside" as a government policy. The main measures in favor of the rural sector issued throughout the 2000s included the abolishment of agricultural taxes and levies, public investment in infrastructure, easing restrictions on rural-to-urban migration, the implementation of nine-year free compulsory education, and the development of a rural safety net programs such as medical and pension systems (Dong, Bowles, and Chang 2010) . For the 2000s, the available evidence ªnds a substantial decrease in the rural poverty rate, but an increase in extreme poverty for the remaining poor (Luo and Sicular 2013) .
Since the early 1980s, the Chinese government has been committed to formulating and implementing poverty reduction policies that can be broadly classiªed into ªve phases (Table 1) . From 1978 to 1985, the leadership encouraged rural reforms, which boosted agricultural production and enabled a large share of rural households to attain food security and get out of poverty. In 1986, after the immediate beneªts of rural reforms faded away, the Chinese government initiated a nationwide poverty alleviation strategy and established the Leading Group for Economic Development in Poor Areas (renamed the State Council Leading Group of Poverty Alleviation and Development in December 1993) to supervise and monitor the implementation of a range of antipoverty initiatives. As highlighted by Meng (2013) , the novelty of the strategy was that poverty targeting was based on ofªcially designated poor counties 5 and the emphasis was put on the promotion of revenuegenerating activities, and more generally economic development. Part of the strategy relied on the creation of special funds for subsidized loans, FFWs, and budgetary grants to poor areas. Despite the various programs offered, the growth of agri-92 Asian Economic Papers Pro-rural Policies, Income, and Inequality cultural productivity came to a halt from the mid 1980s and poverty reduction stagnated for years.
In 1994, the central government unveiled a new antipoverty program called the "8-7 Plan" with the objective of lifting the remaining 80 million rural poor out of poverty within seven years (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) . The new plan was actually meant to intensify the existing policies. Covering 592 counties, it maintained the three main channels for poverty reduction through subsidized loans for investment in production and economic development, FFWs to build rural infrastructure, and government budgetary grants. Using a regression discontinuity design, Meng (2013) estimates that the 8-7 Plan produced a sizeable positive impact on rural income growth.
At the turn of the century, the government took a new step in its antipoverty strategy by launching the New Century Rural Poverty Alleviation Plan for 2001-10. The major innovation of this plan was to switch from an area-based poverty reduction policy to people-centered approaches, keeping the same transfer tools as in previous programs. In particular, the new plan took into account the fact that in western regions, poor households are scattered in poor villages rather than concentrated in poor counties. Hence, in addition to poor counties, it targeted 50,000 poor villages, with the aim of reaching poor villages in non-poor counties excluded from previous programs.
The latest phase in the country's effort to eradicate poverty started in 2011, when China issued a new policy outline for poverty alleviation ("Outline for Poverty Reduction and Development of China's Rural Areas ") over the next ten years. Apart from the emphasis on the need to improve infrastructure and public The main tools for rural poverty reduction that have been put forward with a different intensity over time include the four pathways highlighted by Christiaensen, Pan, and Wang (2013) : improvements in agricultural productivity, rural nonfarm diversiªcation, and migration and transfers. During the 1980s, an important development that has helped boost the rural economy has been the growth of rural industries in the countryside, providing job opportunities to millions of peasants who were restricted from moving to cities by the household registration system (hukou).
As market reforms proceeded and the household registration system became less stringent than before, rural-to-urban migration has become an increasingly more feasible way for reducing poverty in the countryside. Du, Park, and Wang (2005) ªnd that having a migrant increases a household's income per capita by 8.5 to 13.1 percent. The overall impact of migration on poverty reduction is modest because most poor people do not migrate (Du et al. 2005 ). Helping to improve income and living conditions for those staying in the countryside remains a daunting issue and alternative solutions need to be found and implemented. This is the focus of this paper: The program under study provides an interesting case study of a local small-scale initiative that offers alternative local sources of income to peasants. Pro-rural Policies, Income, and Inequality of Beijing is located in an ecologically fragile and vulnerable area that suffers from chronic water shortages (particularly fuelled by a prolonged dry spell between 1999 and 2007), water pollution, and low forest quality and ecological functions. About two-thirds of the municipality surface is mountainous, with forest coverage of 35 percent in 2005 (Nolte 2008 ). On the economic side, the municipality is characterized, as many other provinces in China, by a large income gap between urban and rural areas: in 2004, the ratio of per capita disposable income in urban Beijing to per capita net income in rural Beijing was 2.5. Given its mountainous topography, the landlocked areas of the municipality have not had much opportunity to beneªt from the rapid economic development of the urbanized part of the municipality.
The Beijing Forest Eco-Compensation Fund
In September 2004, the Bureau of Forestry and the Bureau of Finance of the municipality of Beijing promulgated a document that laid out concrete measures and requirements for the implementation of the compensation mechanism, and the Beijing Forest Eco-Compensation Fund was launched in December 2004 for a period of six years (Nolte 2008) . The core of the compensation fund was to create forest warden jobs to protect ecological forests in Beijing's mountainous areas. By the end of 2006, about 46,000 jobs of forest wardens had been created across villages in the municipality, accounting for 20 percent of the 230,000 total rural surplus labor force of the area (Gao, Mi, and Cui 2008) , and about 640,000 hectares of ecological forests were managed through the program.
The budget comes primarily from the municipality, and is distributed annually by the town and township ªnancial departments to the villages under their jurisdiction. Forest wardens are responsible for forest tending, pest control, and preventing forest ªres or illegal logging. Their main task is then to watch over the use of ªre in the open air and to control logging. In practice, they mostly supervise the neighborhoods of the village, without going deeply into the forest. The targeted population for the job are peasants, preferably those with low income. Village cadres and villagers engaged in industry or services with secure off-farm income are explicitly made non-eligible (Nolte 2008) . There is no special skill requirement for applying for the job, age (if less mobile). A rotation among inhabitants or households every year is also allowed to favor intra-village redistribution. The monthly salary per person was initially suggested at RMB 400, with the possibility for adjusting the rules and the level of wages to be paid to forest wardens at the village level. For equal distribution purposes, for example, some villages in our study site have decided to increase the number of wardens recruited at a lower salary.
Given its design, the program falls into the category of a cash-for-work program (Andersson et al. 2011) : local people are employed in public work (3 days a week) and the major economic objectives of the program are to smooth peasants' income and improve the living conditions of local households, while contributing to a public good-forest protection, in this case. By doing so, the program also aims at creating awareness on the importance of sustainable forests among the village community, encouraging villagers to protect their forest, and more generally changing their attitudes towards forests.
Study site and data
The survey site is in the Labagoumen township, which is located in the Huairou district in the municipality of Beijing. The township constitutes the northernmost group of villages in the municipality on the Hebei border, with a population of about 7,000 inhabitants. Surrounded by high and steep forested mountains, it is characterized by a rough topography and unfavorable weather conditions. Forest land represents 83 percent of total land and arable land only accounts for 3 percent. As a consequence, the population pressure upon land is severe and the average farm size is less than 0.5 hectare per household. In economic terms, the area is poor compared with both neighboring townships and provinces (Démurger, Fournier, and Yang 2010) . Until recently, the agricultural sector alone employed most of the active population, and the township relied heavily on subsistence agriculture and the production of corn for seed. Because it is located upstream of the Miyun reservoir (Beijing municipality's most important source of drinking water), the area was targeted by several ecological protection policies before the implementation of the Beijing forest eco-compensation fund, which have also impacted the local economic structure. In particular, the establishment of a municipal-level nature reserve in 1999 enhanced its tourist appeal, thus promoting the development of tourism-related activities in some villages (Démurger, Fournier, and Yang 2010; Démurger and Fournier 2011) . Moreover, from 2001 onwards, the implementation of the nationwide SLCP in the township contributed to the conversion of agricultural land into forested land and a progressive reduction of purely agricultural activities.
The data used are drawn from a household survey carried out in March 2009 within a larger project designed to analyze the welfare impact of various ecological protection policies in the township. Ten administrative villages were chosen so as to be fairly representative of the geographical and economic conditions of the township. The area is served by two main roads: national highway 111 (that links Beijing city to Heilongjiang province) and a secondary road that runs to the entrance of the nature reserve in Sunzhazi village. Among the ten villages surveyed, four are located along the national highway, three are located along the (only) secondary road, and the other three are remote villages with no direct access to the national highway. In each village, about 30 to 35 households were randomly selected and interviewed on a face-to-face basis by enumerators from Beijing Forestry University. A total of 321 households were interviewed, with 233 households engaged in the forest ecocompensation program. Households were given a (30 yuan value) gift in compensation for the time they spent with the survey team. The survey includes information about both family and individual members. Household information includes farm and non-farm activities, income by source, durable goods, and asset holdings.
As described earlier, the Beijing forest eco-compensation fund policy has been implemented in a decentralized manner and each village was basically free to set its own rules to allocate the forest warden jobs. Table 2 shows inter-village differences in program participation and in income by source. It highlights substantial heterogeneity across villages both in the share of households involved in the program (from 16.7 to 91.4 percent) and in the share of income that the program brings to villagers (from 7.1 to 55 percent). Villages can be grouped depending on main income sources and their share in total household income. A ªrst group is made of villages where the share of agricultural income in total income remains relatively high (between 22 and 37 percent) and the share of other income sources (including subsidies) is above 20 percent, and the share of off-farm income is lower than 50 percent. These villages can be characterized as agricultural villages where government subsidies make a non-negligible source of income. A second group is composed of villages where off-farm income accounts for about three-quarters of total income, whereas the agricultural activity provides a much smaller share of income and other sources of income are negligible. This group typically includes villages that have sent many young people to migrate and that are also strongly involved in the forest warden program. The third group is composed of villages with very little income from agriculture, either because they have sent migrants to cities or because they have converted most of their agricultural land from which they receive governmental compensation through the Sloping land conversion program.
Identifying recipient households and participating individuals
We start by identifying program recipient households. For this purpose, we proceed in two steps. We ªrst report summary statistics for participating and nonparticipating households. We then use a probit participation model to investigate the key drivers of participation in the forest warden program at both the household and village levels. Table 3 shows summary statistics for the whole sample as well as comparisons between participating households and non-participating households. In terms of raw statistics, participating and non-participating households mostly differ in household composition and labor force availability, and they share common characteristics in productive and non-productive assets. Hence, households in both groups do not signiªcantly differ in asset holdings, measured by arable land per capita and the equipment of the dwelling with a bathroom. In contrast, they differ in household size and composition: participating households are signiªcantly larger with more active members and fewer elderly members. Similarly, participating households have signiªcantly younger household heads and members in better (self-reported) health. All these factors indicate a better availability of working-age and healthy people in participating households for enrolling in a rather time-consuming activity.
In the second step, we use a maximum likelihood probit estimation to identify the program participation drivers at the household level. The estimated probit equation takes the following form:
where P i equals 1 if at least one of the members of the household i holds a forest warden job and zero otherwise. The household program participation is determined by a vector of observable household characteristics X, which contains households characteristics (age of household head, average household health status, ethnic minority status, and local political status), household composition and labor force (household size, number of active members, elderly and children below seven years old, a dummy for participation in the SLCP, and a dummy for having migrants in city), and household assets (arable land per adult and house equipped with a bathroom). The vector V contains village ªxed effects and ⑀ is the error term for the unobservable factors that may affect program participation. Table 4 gives the marginal effects of the likelihood of households' program participation. First, household composition and assets are found to be important drivers: larger households with a larger labor force (more active members, fewer elderly members, no migrants) available for enrolling as forest wardens are more likely to participate, whereas wealthier households (whose dwelling is equipped with a bathroom) are less likely to participate. These results are consistent with the propoor objective of CFW programs: recipient households are those most in need with available labor force to enroll. This is complemented by the positive association between participation in the SLCP and the forest warden program. Because the land retirement associated with SLCP participation mechanically reduced labor force needs for agricultural activity, SLCP participating households are more likely to have available labor force for undertaking a time-consuming activity. Interestingly, we also ªnd that households with more arable land per adult are more likely to participate. This ªnding suggests that participation in the forest warden program is a complement to, rather than a substitute for, farming activities. Finally, the estimation also shows the importance of age in determining household's participation: households with younger household heads are more likely to participate in the program.
To complement the household-level analysis, we turn to individual job choices and forest warden program participation. For this analysis, the sample is restricted to individuals aged between 16 and 75 years, which roughly corresponds to the local available labor force. 8 Table 5 shows the distribution of individual occupations for this sub-sample. At the individual level, a person can be employed in more than one job, especially if they are a forest warden, which is not a full-time job by deªnition. Hence, ªgures reported in the table do not sum up exactly because some individuals actually hold more than one occupation. About two-thirds of the surveyed workingage individuals have a farming activity; slightly less than half are employed as forest wardens, and those working off the farm, either locally or as migrants, account for 11 percent and 14 percent, respectively. Finally, almost one in ªve individuals does not engage in any productive activity.
There is a clear correlation between farming and participation in the forest warden program: 89.6 percent of the individuals who declare being forest wardens also declare some family farming activity. Likewise, two-thirds of the farmers declared being forest wardens at the same time. Table 6 shows the correlation between occupations, and conªrms the complementarity between these two activities: the correlation coefªcient at 0.585 is by far the largest and is highly signiªcant. In contrast, local off-farm activity is not signiªcantly correlated with forest warden activity and, unsurprisingly, migration is negatively correlated with forest warden activity.
Non-parametric kernel density estimations for the age distribution by activity are presented in Figure 1 . As widely documented in the empirical literature on China, rural-to-urban migration is highly concentrated in the 20-30 year age group. This is also the case for our sample. Interestingly, and as a further illustration of the complementarity between forest warden activity and farming, the age distribution of forest wardens follows that of farmers, with an average age for forest wardens at 49.4 years, above the sample average (44.4 years). Among other demographic characteristics of forest wardens, about half are women and they tend to be slightly less educated than the overall sample (aged between 16 and 75) with an average of 6.5 years of education compared with 7.4 years.
To examine the determinants of individual participation in the forest warden program, we use a multinomial logit model where any other occupation than farming or forest warden is the reference. Because farming and forest warden activities can be undertaken jointly, we consider separately the following three choices: joint farming and forest warden activity, forest warden job only, farming only. We test the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) hypothesis with the HausmanMcFadden test based on comparing the estimated parameters with parameters obtained by excluding the alternatives one by one. The IIA hypothesis cannot be rejected at conventional levels, which allows us to use a multinomial logit model. The estimation results are reported in Table 7 . The reported coefªcients are exponential values that can be easily interpreted in terms of relative risk ratios: for each variable X, the relative risk ratio tells us how the probability of choosing j relative to the baseline alternative changes if X increases by one unit.
Individual characteristics matter for program participation. Unsurprisingly, we ªnd that program participation increases with age and decreases with the education level (as does farming). This ªnding might reºect some intra-household division of labor across age cohorts: younger, more educated members are involved in more remunerative off-farm activities (either locally or as migrants) whereas older members remain in farming and take the cash-for-work opportunity offered through the program. Interestingly, a gender difference appears between farming and forest warden choices: although men tend to be signiªcantly more into farming, they are signiªcantly less likely to choose forest warden only. This result may be related to the fact that being a forest warden only means that the person is unemployed otherwise. The program may thus have given an opportunity to women doing only housework to derive some additional income for the family. Finally, whereas minority people are signiªcantly more likely to engage in farm work than in any other off-farm work, it is not the case for program participation (if anything, they would actually be less likely to participate). Likewise, whereas being a party member or a village committee member strongly increases the individual likelihood of doing farming rather than off-farm work, there is no signiªcant difference for forest warden activity. This result suggests that the program requirements about individual eligibility have been followed because local ofªcials were not eligible.
Regarding household characteristics, the individual program participation rate seems to be more inºuenced by household size and composition through their impact on farming decision than directly because none of these characteristics signiªcantly inºuence the forest warden only choice. Interestingly, when it comes to household assets, we ªnd that larger arable land per adult reduces the probability to enroll as a forest warden only but increases the probability to do farming, which can be complemented by being a forest warden. This ªnding conªrms that farming and forest warden activities are complementary and that the program did not have any strong disincentive effect on farming activities. In sum, the multivariate analyses proposed in this section give support to a fairly good correspondence between the targeting objective and the outcome of the forest warden program. At the household level, poorer households are found to be signiªcantly more likely to participate and at the individual level, people with lower alternative opportunities (older people, less educated people, and women) are found to be more likely to engage in forest warden activity. Our results also clearly indicate a complementarity between farming activities and the forest warden program, which supports the absence of any signiªcant disincentive effect of the CFW program on local farming activities.
The distributional impact of the program
To investigate how the Beijing forest eco-compensation fund is affecting local livelihood patterns, we now turn to an analysis of household income and income inequality. In 2008, average household income was 18,439 yuan, with a median at 12,900 yuan. In per capita terms, the corresponding ªgures were 5,633 yuan and 4,500 yuan. The average per capita income is 18 percent above the national per capita net income of rural residents reported by the National Bureau of Statistics of China (Table 8) . 9 Indeed, whereas farm income represented more than one-third of the households' annual income in 2003, it only accounted for 18 percent in 2008, despite the fact that the percentage of households involved in farming was actually higher in 2008. The drop in the farm income share was compensated for by an increase in off-farm income share, which accounted for about two-thirds of the annual income in 2008. For those households with income from a speciªc source, it is by far the most remunerative (whatever the source). The majority of off-farm income comes from two sources: forest warden salaries (with a share of 34 percent in total average income) and migrants' remittances (15 percent). Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) and decompose the Gini coefªcient by income sources. As such, the Gini coefªcient for total family income inequality G can be expressed as follows:
where k stands for income component, S k is the share of income source k in total income, G k is the relative Gini of component k (corresponding to the distribution of income from source k), and R k the Gini correlation between income component k and total income. Thus for any income component k, S k measures how important the income component is with respect to total income, G k indicates how (un)equally distributed the income component is, and R k how the income component and the distribution of total income are correlated.
Using this decomposition method, Table 9 presents the contribution of income sources to income and to income inequality. The weights of income sources S k displayed in column (1) show that remittances from migrants and forest warden salaries both represent the largest income shares, at respectively 26 and 23 percent, followed by farm income (15 percent), other wage work earnings (13 percent), subsidies (6 percent), family non-agricultural income (6 percent), and income from self-employment (5 percent).
In terms of income distribution, column (2) shows a large variation across income sources. The most unequally distributed sources of income are, by decreasing order, income from self-employment (with a source Gini at 0.95), family nonagricultural income, other income, and other wage work. Remittances come ªfth, and they are also strongly unequally distributed across households, with a source Gini at 0.83. On the other hand, forest warden salaries clearly exhibit a much more equal distribution (0.50) compared with any other source of income, while agricultural income and subsidies are intermediate. A high source Gini does not necessarily imply that the income component has a disequalizing effect on total income inequality (Taylor et al. 2005) , however. Indeed, if an income source is unequally distributed, its impact on total income inequality will ultimately depend upon which households, at which points of the income distribution, receive the income source. In our sample, this is the case for "other income," which mostly includes pensions and is an income component for only 15 percent of the households. Although the source Gini coefªcient is 0.94 for other income, the Gini correlation with the distribution of total income R k is small (0.36) and the percentage contribution of other income to inequality (3 percent) is smaller than their percentage contribution to income S k (4 percent). Table 9 clearly highlights two important sources of income, remittances and forest warden salaries, which have opposite effects on the distribution of rural income. On one hand, remittances are not only unequally distributed, but they also have a disequalizing effect on total income, as shown in columns (4) and (5). The Gini correlation of migrant remittances with the distribution of total income R k is high (0.80) and the percentage contribution of remittances to inequality is actually much larger (37 percent) than their percentage contribution to income S k (23 percent). On the other hand, the equalizing role of forest warden jobs is conªrmed by the small Gini correlation with the distribution of total income R k (0.27) and the small percentage contribution of forest warden salaries to income inequality (8 percent), despite their large percentage contribution to income S k (26 percent).
Using the Gini decomposition, we can also estimate the impact of small changes in an income source on inequality, holding income from all other sources constant (Stark, Taylor, and Yitzhaki 1986) . This is shown in the last column of Table 9 . As expected, both remittances and forest warden salaries have the highest impact on in- equality, one being the largest income disequalizer and the other the largest income equalizer. Hence, although a 1 percent increase in remittances would increase the Gini coefªcient of total income by 0.14 percent, a 1 percent increase in forest warden salaries would reduce the Gini coefªcient by a similar amount, at 0.17 percent. Interestingly, besides forest warden wages, the other income components that are income equalizer are subsidies, farm income, and, to a very small extent, other income. Regarding subsidies, which partly include compensations received within the SLCP, the Gini decomposition shows that a 1 percent increase in subsidies would reduce the Gini coefªcient by 0.08 percent. Hence, compared with another ecological pro-poor program (the SLCP), the forest warden program appears to be twice as income equalizing at the local level.
To complement the analysis, Tables 10 and 11 display income decomposition by source for villages grouped according to the relative importance of their agricultural income. As highlighted in Section 3, there are substantial inter-village differences in program participation and in income by source (see Table 2 ). Hence, the decompositions attempt to highlight how the importance and the distributional impact of various income sources differ across village groups. In villages with important agricultural income (Table 10) , farm income has an equalizing effect, equivalent to that of forest warden wages. A 1 percent increase in farm income reduces total income inequality by 0.07 percent, as would a 1 percent increase in forest warden salaries. In these villages, the source Gini for forest warden wages is much higher, at 0.65, than for the township as a whole, whereas the Gini correlation with the distribution of total income R k is lower. Hence, in villages where farm income is important, the distributional impact of the Beijing forest eco-compensation fund is much less equalizing than in other villages: forest warden salaries are more unequally distributed there, but the Gini correlation is low so that the overall impact is equalizing.
By contrast, in villages where agricultural income is much smaller (with an average income share of 0.11 against 0.27 for agricultural villages), forest warden wages have a strong equalizing effect: a 1 percent increase in forest warden salaries would reduce the total income Gini by 0.25 percent, which is by far the largest marginal effect identiªed. As far as the other income components are concerned, three additional comparisons are worth noticing. First, farm income is only an income equalizer for agricultural villages (Table 10) , and the income component has no effect for other villages (Table 11) . Second, in both groups of villages, remittances are income disequalizers in similar proportions (with a marginal effect of about 0.14 percent). Third, subsidies are income equalizers for all villages, but their marginal effect is almost twice as high for agricultural villages where they also account for a larger share of total income.
Conclusion
Designing effective anti-poverty strategies is among the main preoccupations of most governments in developing countries. Whether pro-poor programs can indeed achieve the goal of targeting aid to intended beneªciaries, whether they can avoid disincentive effects on agricultural activities, and whether they can help reduce income inequality are central issues to assess. This paper contributes to a better understanding of pro-poor programs achievements by assessing a local CFW program launched in mountainous areas of the Beijing municipality in December 2004. The Beijing forest eco-compensation fund aims at both ensuring forest protection in the area and improving the living conditions of the local population. The compensation mechanism consists of employing local peasants to watch over the village forest at a ªxed monthly remuneration. Using original household survey data, we highlight a fairly large participation rate among local rural households (73 percent), in accordance with the explicitly redistributive design of the policy in most villages. The estimation of participation equations shows that, at the household level, poorer households are signiªcantly more likely to participate, and at the individual level, people with lower alternative opportunities (older people, women, less educated people) are more likely to engage in the forest warden activity. These ªndings suggest a rather good targeting performance of the CFW program, which is corroborated by anecdotal evidence from the ªeld survey, with no record of complaints from interviewed households regarding the selection of households into the program and an overall reported satisfaction towards the program.
As a supportive policy for the poor, CFW is meant to help poor households extract initial income surplus that can be used to gradually increase investment in productive activities in agriculture or in off-arm activities. Given the cross-sectional nature of our data, we cannot claim testing a causal link for our case study. However, participation equations provide evidence of a complementarity between farming activities and forest warden jobs. By bringing in new local non-farm income opportunities, the program seems to have been successful in increasing local income without crowding out local agricultural activities. The absence of any obvious disincentive effect on agricultural activities due to the program is most probably related to the nature of the forest warden job, which does not require intensive work, is rather ºexible and not full-time, and can easily complement agricultural work done on neighboring land. Finally, to complement the analysis, a decomposition of household income inequality by source highlights the strongly equalizing effect of the forest warden income component on peasants' income.
As a case study, the proposed analysis is informative about how local anti-poverty programs can be effectively implemented and their potential achievements. The external validity of such a small-scale study is typically difªcult to assess, however. Although the area under study is poor, poverty there is typically lower than in other, remote parts of China, where access to off-farm income is also presumably lower and subsistence agriculture more prevalent. Nevertheless, it sheds light on the potential beneªts that small-scale, local anti-poverty programs can confer over large-scale, top-down programs. In particular, the informational advantage of local institutions enables a better targeting of beneªciaries, with an immediate distributive effect.
How can the identiªed achievements of the program be translated into long-lasting effects in terms of poverty reduction in the area? What the analysis shows is that, in the short run, the program has brought additional income to households that contributed to equalizing the income distribution at the local level. In that respect, the Beijing forest eco-compensation fund can be considered successful. Transforming the initial surplus income into income-generating activities that can break the poverty spiral is an issue more demanding yet. Reaping the long-term beneªts of the program clearly depends on its ability to improve local peasants' savings on the one hand, and on local opportunities available to support the development of new income-generating activities (including access to credit, access to markets, climate, etc.) on the other.
